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INTRODUCTION 
There are two ways to deterring breaches of competition law. The first one consists in the 
threat of litigation by private parties. Private enforcement is widely used in the US where 
there are approximately ten private actions for each action by the public authorities. The 
second one is enforcement by public agencies. This is the main tool of Competition 
Authorities in continental Europe where very few private actions take place. 
The European Commission has opened a debate on whether and how to encourage private 
antitrust litigation in the EU. In 2005, it launched a Green Paper entitled “Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules”; then it proposes a first set of measures in a White Paper 
published in April 2008. The European Commission’s aim to encourage private actions in 
Europe seems necessary and is based in part on a comprehensive study by Waelbroeck and al. 
(2004),2 which contrasts the situation in the EU with that in the US. Among the main 
motivations of the European Commission, there are: (i) the existing obstacles to bringing 
private actions, especially for consumers, whose claims are small compared to the costs of 
bringing cases and indirect purchasers, due to the “number of layers between them and the 
infringers”, (ii) the fact that cases may be discouraged by “information asymmetry between 
the plaintiff and the defendant” (but are private actions really beneficial unless plaintiffs bring 
information to the case?), (iii) the risk of “unmeritorious actions” (but little is said about how 
to avoid this except appealing to “sufficient judicial control”). Moreover, the European 
Commission also notes that encouraging private actions may raise issues about impact on 
leniency which we do not treat in our paper, but which may be taken into account as 
additional costs of private actions. 
                                                            
1 This article is in part based on the results derived in the paper: Bourjade, S., Rey, P. and Seabright, P., 2009, “Private 
Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-trial Bargaining,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 57(3), pp. 372-409. The 
author is grateful to the Editorial Board, to Patrick Rey and to Paul Seabright for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
2 Walbroeck, D., Slater, D. and Even-Shoshan, G., 2004, “Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in the Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules,” Brussels, Ashurst. 
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In this article, we study the effects of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition 
law. We also analyze how to design a private litigation system which deters anticompetitive 
actions without deterring legitimate pro-competitive actions. 
In order to tackle those problems, we use a game theory framework. Game theory is widely 
used in the law and economics field. Indeed, this allows studying the strategic interaction 
between agents - judge, Courts, firms, potential plaintiffs and defendants - and their incentives 
to modify their behavior when the effective legal rules are changed. The basic idea is to 
consider a framework as simple as possible in order to make it tractable while keeping it the 
closest possible to the real world. Accordingly, we make assumptions that allow us to 
understand the problems we want to study. We then try to generalize the model and the 
conclusions in removing some of the assumptions and in sophisticating the framework. Even 
though we know that this abstraction does not perfectly represent the real world, it enables us 
to better understand the different parties’ behavior and incentives which would otherwise be 
impossible due to the complexity of the real world. 
Encouraging private actions 
Encouraging private actions may be useful for a Competition Authority when private parties 
(customers, suppliers, competitors) reveal to the court the information they have gathered 
about a case and which would not be available to a public enforcer. Indeed, private enforcers 
may be in a better position to determine whether a breach of competition law has effectively 
occurred than a Competition Authority because they are, in general, better informed about 
their particular industry.3 Indeed, as Shavell (1984)4 argues: 
“Private parties should generally enjoy an inherent advantage in knowledge (...). For a 
regulator to obtain comparable information would often require virtually continuous 
observation of parties’ behavior, and thus would be a practical impossibility.”  
One of the key features of private litigation is thus the use of this decentralized information. If 
private parties have more information than public authorities about the fact that a breach of 
competition law has effectively occurred, a private antitrust enforcement system should 
provide those firms with the incentives to reveal truthfully their private information to the 
court. In this case, such a system would induce potential plaintiffs knowing that a breach of 
competition law has effectively occurred to open a case while potential plaintiffs knowing that 
no breach of competition law has occurred would not. Those reforms may thus affect not only 
the number of private actions but also the “quality” of those actions. This issue is known in 
the economics literature as a screening problem. Moreover, even though interested parties 
only accept to reveal their private information in order to get damaged, this may help the court 
to punish liable firms and then to deter future anticompetitive actions. Indeed, these potential 
liable firms may now internalize the compensation for damages when deciding to undertake a 
breach of competition law. 
                                                            
3 It should be noted that having information about a potential anti-competitive conduct is not always sufficient to make a 
successful complaint. However, an informed plaintiff may obtain the necessary evidence in going to court when discovery is 
available to some extent or when the burden of proof is low for plaintiffs. 
4 Shavell S., 1984, “Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety,” Journal of Legal Studies, 13, pp. 357-374. 
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Encouraging private actions in this way may however also result in excessive private actions. 
Moreover, this may also induce private parties to engage in “frivolous actions”,5 or at least to 
bring actions even when there is low evidence of a breach of antitrust laws because they are 
attracted to those high compensations for damages.6 Private parties may also have incentives 
to open a case for other reasons that are not in line with the Competition Authority initial 
objective, e.g., in order to get information about a competitor or in order to reduce a 
competitor’s ability to compete efficiently. When encouraging private actions, a Competition 
Authority should therefore take into account the risk associated to private antitrust 
enforcement when it is used strategically by private parties whose objectives diverge from the 
public one. 
Moreover, in order to determine whether encouraging private actions is desirable or not, the 
goals of antitrust enforcement should be clearly identified. We could argue that a system of 
antitrust enforcement should be designed for two reasons: first, in order to pursue corrective 
justice through compensation of victims; second, to provide firms with incentives not to 
violate the antitrust laws in the first place through deterrence in imposing high penalties in 
case of violation. In this paper, we have decided to focus on the latter objective for antitrust 
enforcement. Indeed, as economists, we are particularly interested in examining how those 
reforms will modify the private parties’ incentives to undertake breach of competition law or 
to open a case. Besides, we also wonder what could be the consequences of a strategic use of 
those reforms by private parties. 
 Then, if deterrence is the primary objective of an antitrust enforcement system, this system 
should prevent firms from undertaking anticompetitive actions that induce a social loss while 
not preventing them from undertaking actions that enhance the social welfare. In another way, 
an efficient enforcement system should minimize both type I errors (false positives which 
may avoid aggressive competition and innovation) and type II errors (false negatives which 
may harm competition). 
THE INNOCENT’S CURSE 
Private antitrust enforcement cannot be analyzed without considering the possibility of out-of-
court settlements. Indeed, a large number of cases are settled and do not go to trial. For 
instance, using data for private antitrust cases involving firms from the US, Perloff, Rubinfeld 
and Ruud (1996) document that 86.6% of cases in their sample are settled out of court.7 The 
fact that most private parties accept settlement offers without going to trial is not irrational, 
since going to trial is usually costly and time-consuming. In addition, if private actions are 
encouraged by the introduction of multiple damages awarded to successful plaintiffs, not only 
the number of cases filed should rise but also the number of out-of-court settlements. We will 
                                                            
5 By “frivolous actions” we mean actions being only opened by plaintiffs in order to get damaged even though they have low 
evidence that the potential defendant has really committed a breach of competition law. 
6 For instance, Hovenkamp (2005) stated that a system of multiple damages may induce potential plaintiffs to open marginal 
and even frivolous actions. Hovenkamp, H., 2005, “The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution,” Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
7 Perloff, J. M., Rubinfeld, D. L. and Ruud, P., “Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 78, pp. 401-409. 
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therefore analyze here the effects of increasing the amount of damages awarded to successful 
plaintiffs on private antitrust enforcement, taking into consideration their impact on 
settlements. 
Once private settlements are taken into account, encouraging private actions can lead to some 
strikingly counter-intuitive consequences. Most people would expect that an increase in 
private actions would undoubtedly lead - if it is to be effective at deterring violations of 
competition law - to a significant number of firms appearing before the Courts, most of whom 
would indeed have committed the violations alleged. However, if firms can settle out of court, 
and if the Courts are reasonably reliable at establishing the truth of allegations, it should be 
the violators who settle and the innocent firms that refuse. An effective system should 
therefore lead to mainly innocent firms appearing before the Courts.8 
This result has already been documented in the literature, and we note it here so as to 
emphasize what is original in our results. Indeed, others have argued that pre-trial settlement 
may result in the innocent being disproportionately represented among the cases that go to 
trial.9 We call this phenomenon the “innocent’s curse”. Our framework allows us to analyze 
its robustness with respect to a modification of the legal rules. More precisely, we show that 
the plaintiff will not initiate a case if the opening costs are too high. However, when these 
costs are low enough, the plaintiff initiates a case and a violator always settles, whereas an 
innocent defendant settles only when the plaintiff is “aggressive”: this happens when the 
compensation damages are large, the prior probability of a violation and/or the quality of the 
judgments are important, and/or the cost of trials is limited. Thus when trial costs are large, 
for example, private enforcement benefits the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, who 
ends up paying the same settlement compensation, whether there has been a violation or not. 
Private antitrust enforcement is clearly not desirable in such a case, since it has no deterrent 
effect on potential violators and merely transfers money from defendants to plaintiffs. Indeed, 
an efficient antitrust litigation system has to “screen” liable firms from non-liable ones. This 
objective is achieved when trial costs are lower. In this case, private enforcement helps to 
deter potential violators from engaging in anticompetitive behavior and allows the court to 
screen innocent defendants from violators, since the former go to trial while the latter accept a 
high settlement offer. 
We also show that a modification of the enforcement rules may affect both the plaintiffs’ 
incentives to launch a case and their incentives to behave aggressively when making the out 
of court settlement offers. As a consequence of our results, inducing plaintiffs to behave 
aggressively enhances enforcement. Indeed, the fact that plaintiffs behave aggressively makes 
                                                            
8 In their paper based on a US antitrust dataset, Perloff and Rubinfeld (1987) have found that Defendants win 70% of their 
antitrust cases when they go to trial. Perloff J. M. and Rubinfeld D. L., 1987, “Settlements in Private Antitrust Litigation,” 
Lawrence J. White, ed., Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Meaning, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
9 See for instance Grossman and Katz (1983), Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Reinganum (1988), and Baker 
and Mezzetti (2001). Grossman, G. M. and Katz, M. L., 1983, “Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare,” American Economic 
Review, 73, pp. 749-757. Bebchuk, L., 1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 15, pp. 404-415. Reinganum, J. and Wilde, L., 1986, “Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation 
Costs,” Rand Journal of Economics, 17, pp. 557-568. Reinganum, J., 1988, “Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion,” 
American Economic Review, 78, pp. 713-728. Baker, S.  and Mezzetti, C., 2001, “Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining 
and the Decision to go to Trial,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 17, pp. 149-167. 
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possible the screening of liable from non-liable defendants which increases the costs - 
including potential costs of going to trial and compensation for damages - faced by liable 
defendants while reducing non-liable defendants’ costs. This, in turn, reduces the prior 
incentives of firms to undertake anticompetitive actions while raising their prior incentives to 
undertake pro-competitive actions. Private actions are therefore only able to modify the ex-
ante behavior of firms if they induce plaintiffs to be aggressive in the pre-trial bargaining. 
However, as we show below, this can be a difficult system to maintain, notably if the Courts 
react to the frequency of innocent defendants by making it difficult to secure a conviction, 
since violators will exploit this. 
THE ROLE OF BACKGROUND EVIDENCE 
We have seen that one should take into account the fact that private actions only help to 
enforce competition law when parties who have information relevant to the enforcement 
process are encouraged to reveal it. Indeed, if it was not the case, the Courts would do as well 
by opening investigations randomly. It might seem as though this implies that therefore the 
Court should use all the information at its disposal, and make decisions based on a fully 
Bayesian-rational assessment of the evidence.10 However, we show that this intuition is false. 
When we allow pre-trial bargaining between plaintiffs and defendants, the deterrence effect of 
private actions is not only due to the fines and damages imposed by the judge to the liable 
parties but also to the defendants’ incentives to settle out of court for large amounts if they 
anticipate that the judge will find them liable. When the rules of procedure are designed, we 
should thus not only ensure that the information generated during the trial and by the private 
parties is translated into an optimal decision but also ensure that those rules give the right 
incentives for pre-trial bargaining, because this will affect the types of defendants that will 
finally go to trial. 
We therefore show that in order to get a more effective screening of violators from non-
violators - and thus a more effective antitrust enforcement -, the rules of judicial procedure 
should oblige the Courts to rely solely on the facts established during the trial and not on 
background evidence about settlement offers. This result may seem paradoxical. Indeed, on 
the one hand, in order to be efficient, private actions should encourage parties to reveal their 
private information; on the other hand, the Courts should be prevented from using the overall 
available information. This implies that the Courts’ decisions should not take into account 
what they know about the incentives for liable and non-liable firms to settle out of court.  
Thus, an efficient private antitrust system requires restrictions on the use of certain 
information by the Courts if the appropriate incentives for deterring anticompetitive and 
encouraging pro-competitive behavior are to be maintained. Judge Posner (1999)11 also 
argues in favor of the exclusion of settlement offers from evidence:  
                                                            
10A Bayesian- rational Court is supposed to reason logically, using information about her prior probabilities - previous 
decisions, anticipation of the incentives and behavior of the plaintiff and the defendant… - and information available from the 
evidence generated during the trial, in order to reach a decision. 
11 Posner, R. A., 1999, “An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,” Stanford Law Review, 51, pp. 1477-1521. 
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“The rationale for excluding settlement offers from evidence is straightforward. Although 
such evidence would be relevant in showing how the party who made the offer evaluated the 
strength of his case and therefore how strong that case probably is, allowing the evidence to 
be presented at trial if settlement negotiations break down would increase the cost of settling 
cases and so reduce the number of settlements.”  
We go further and show that not only the content of settlement offers should be excluded but 
also the fact that a settlement offer has occurred or has been rejected. Out-of-court settlements 
can therefore have a radical impact on the results of a system of private actions, and any 
policy proposal needs to be evaluated with this in mind. 
The literature on Bayesian reasoning by the courts makes a number of distinct points. Let us 
state more clearly our contributions to this literature. Friedman and Wickelgren (2002)12 do 
not model settlement or litigation but point out that it is not possible to deter crime entirely 
when judges (or jurors) engage in Bayesian reasoning. The intuition is that a judge would 
never convict if she was convinced that no crime was ever committed. Our result shows 
something even stronger: taking into account background evidence worsens the problem, 
since private actions may be incapable of treating antitrust violators any differently from non-
violators. Schrag and Scotchmer (1994)13 propose another type of argument. They analyze 
when Courts should use character evidence in criminal trials. In their model there is no 
settlement. There are high crime and low crime individuals, who differ in their opportunity 
costs of crime. They show that under some conditions when the jury is prejudiced against 
habitual criminals, restricting character evidence improves deterrence (the opposite is true 
when there is no prejudice). Though their result has some similarities in spirit to our own, the 
underling mechanism is quite different. In particular our result has nothing to do with 
prejudice, but rather to a tension between Bayesian reasoning and the need for trial procedures 
to generate optimal incentives for pre-trial settlement. Fluet and Demougin (2006, 2008)14 
also show that Bayesian reasoning can have perverse effects, though for reasons that once 
again are quite different from ours. They consider the provision of ex-ante incentives to exert 
care in tort litigation and show that better ex-ante incentives are provided by not relying on 
evidence such as background statistics or character evidence. However, this has nothing to do 
with incentives for out-of-court settlement, which has no place in their model. Secondly, the 
nature of the evidence that should be excluded is different in their analysis: they show that 
litigation provides better ex-ante incentives by excluding evidence that is insensitive to the 
parties’ decisions or actions, while our own result excludes evidence about the likelihood of 
guilt conditional on the outcome of pre-trial bargaining. 
Furthermore, we are the first to our knowledge to show how such restrictions follow from 
considerations of optimal design of the judicial mechanism when the underlying problem 
consists of using the private information of plaintiffs - through the choice of cases to open and 
                                                            
12 Friedman, E. and Wickelgren, A., 2006, “Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence,” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 22(1), pp. 70-86. 
13 Schrag, J., and Scotchmer, S., 1994, “Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal Trials,” Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organizations, 10(2), pp. 319-342. 
14 Demougin, D. and Fluet, C., 2006, “Preponderance of Evidence,” European Economic Review, 50, pp. 963-976. 
Demougin, D. and Fluet, C., 2008, “Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives,” Rand Journal of Economics, 39(1), pp. 20-40. 
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settlement offers to propose - to deter undesirable behavior among defendants while not 
discouraging desirable behavior. This means that we can also use our framework to show 
which types of cases an optimal design should encourage and which types it should 
discourage. 
DESIGNING THE RULES OF A SYSTEM OF PRIVATE ACTIONS 
We next study the optimal way to design the rules of a system of private actions and to 
address the issue of deterrence. We show that not all ways of encouraging private actions are 
equally good in terms of incentives to commit breaches of competition laws. It is better to 
increase damages than to lower costs of opening a case since the former weighs more on 
liable than on non-liable defendants. Indeed, while both tools raise the costs faced by both 
liable and non-liable defendants, increasing the trial costs reduces the plaintiff’s incentives to 
be aggressive in pre-trial bargaining. Aggressiveness being the only way to screen liable from 
non-liable defendants, this is not desirable from an enforcement perspective. Increasing 
damages is therefore more effective in terms of deterrence than the fear of trial costs since the 
latter are more likely to discourage legitimate pro-competitive behavior. Great caution should 
be exercised before encouraging such actions by reductions in the costs of opening a suit as 
these encourage well-founded and poorly-founded cases to the same degree.15 
Moreover, we also show that this effect is enhanced when plaintiffs have significant private 
information and when law is clear and Courts reliable (e.g. this is better for cartels than for 
Article 82/Section 2 cases). We show that it is a good idea to encourage private actions when 
plaintiffs’ private information about wrongdoing helps to improve the decision of the court 
about the case with respect to the information generated during the trial. This means that 
private actions are useful for litigation when they don’t induce plaintiffs to open “frivolous 
actions”. Our analysis may help to shed light on the lawsuits that are undesirable in terms of 
the performance of the law system. We show that it is optimal to solely encourage plaintiffs 
with a sufficiently high quality of information about the case to launch a claim. Following this 
recommendation may allow the decision authority to reduce the frivolous plaintiffs’ 
incentives to litigate without preventing genuine plaintiffs from launching a case. This result 
is consistent with Segal and Whinston (2007)16 who underline that:  
“Standing to sue for antitrust violations is sometimes given not to those who suffered the most 
damage but to those who have the highest likelihood of being informed about potential 
violations. For example, the U.S. Illinois Brick case gives the standing to sue to the immediate 
buyers of the violators, even when they were in the position of passing on the overcharge 
resulting from the violation downstream to their consumers. (...) This ruling has been justified 
by the fact that the immediate buyers are more likely to detect violations than the downstream 
buyers, and so they should be given incentive to sue for these violations. The downstream 
buyers do not have standing to sue, even if they are the ones who were harmed the most.” 
                                                            
15 This result argues in favor of strengthening Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is designed to combat 
baseless claims. 
16 Segal, I.R. and Whinston, M.D., 2007, "Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey," European 
Competition Law Review, 2007, pp. 323-332. 
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We then study the question of the allocation of the costs of litigation between the different 
parties. The most used allocations are the “American Rule” (each party pays their own costs) 
and the “English Rule” (the loser pays all cost). Shavell (1982) and Katz (1990)17 show that 
the English Rule discourages low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs and encourages high-
probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs. Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) found 
that the litigation rate rises with the English rule.18 We show that it is always optimal to 
reimburse a defendant’s costs when it is not found liable but that it may not be the case for the 
costs of the plaintiff because this may deter some pro-competitive actions. This implies that 
the English Rule may therefore not be the most efficient, as suggested by Shavell (1982) and 
Katz (1990), when the litigation rules allow an asymmetric allocation of the costs of litigation 
between the different parties. 
In any case, encouraging private actions increases the litigation burden on non-liable 
defendants as well, even though reimbursing a defendant’s costs when it is not found liable 
mitigates this effect. We thus introduce a compensation awarded to defendants found non-
liable in order to further reduce this burden. This introduces some symmetry in the way the 
procedure deals with plaintiffs and defendants when they are successful. Indeed, damages for 
successful plaintiffs helps to deter anticompetitive actions without deterring pro-competitive 
actions thanks to the introduction of compensation for defendants found non-liable. 
Compensating winning defendants may therefore reduce the procedure’s favoritism of 
plaintiffs, which is emphasized by Baker (2004)19:  
“The practical effect of mandatory trebling is to tilt the settlement process in the plaintiff’s 
favor because mandatory trebling so inflates the defendant’s cost of losing and the plaintiff’s 
value of a victory in a rule of reason case. Is this favoritism something that we really would 
want to recommend to other nations for all kinds of competition law violations?” 
We then show that the optimal rules include high enough damages and compensating 
damages in case of no conviction. It is therefore possible to “exactly” compensate the 
defendant for wrong cases. More precisely, when the procedure allows successful defendants 
to be compensated, the damages paid to winning plaintiffs should be set as high as is required 
to deter all violations of competition law, and the compensation for defendants found non-
liable as high as is required to ensure that no pro-competitive actions are deterred. 
However, we admit that this conclusion is not very realistic. Indeed, we assume that the 
Courts cannot impose upper limits to the levels of fines and compensation payments. 
Moreover, in practice, the fines and compensations cannot be set as high as desired because of 
firms' limited liability, or also because of risk aversion, a phenomenon we have ignored in our 
model. Indeed, risk aversion means that the level of needed fines to deter anticompetitive 
                                                            
17 Shavell, S., 1982, “Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of 
Legal Costs,” Journal of Legal Studies, 11, pp. 55-82. Katz, A.W., 1990, “The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement 
of Litigation,” International Review of Law and Economics, 10, pp. 3-27. 
18 Bebchuk, L., 1984, “Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 404-415. 
Reinganum, J. and Wilde, L., 1986, “Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 17, pp. 557-568. 
19 Baker, D.I., 2004, “Revisiting History - What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would 
Recommend to Others?” Loyola Consumer Law Review, 16, pp. 379-408. 
9 
 
actions can be lowered. However, it also means that it may be impossible for the Courts to 
impose a level of compensation to unsuccessful plaintiffs which exactly offsets the risk for 
defendants who have undertaken a pro-competitive action of being found liable. Yet, those 
results strongly support the introduction of compensation for defendants found non-liable in 
addition of damages for successful plaintiffs when private actions are allowed. Indeed, this 
ensures that plaintiffs only open cases for which they have a high enough probability of 
winning. This, in turn, raises the extent to which anticompetitive actions can be deterred and 
pro-competitive actions encouraged even though this is not possible in practice to prevent a 
non-liable defendant from bearing some risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing contributions from the Law and Economics literature have shown that pre-trial 
settlement negotiations may have some unexpected consequences. Starting from those 
conclusions, we have characterized the problem of designing a system of private antitrust 
actions as one of inducing the optimal use of private information of potential plaintiffs so as 
to discourage undesirable behavior among defendants without discouraging desirable 
behavior. We have shown that this optimal use of private information paradoxically requires 
the judicial system to disregard some information available to the Courts, and to discourage 
certain actions by plaintiffs who are informed but not informed reliably enough. We hope that 
our analysis of the effect of various parameters of the judicial process - such as fines, levels of 
legal costs and the costs of opening a lawsuit - will provide useful guidance for the design of 
systems of private anti-trust actions, and that our proposition for more symmetric incentives - 
notably for successful defendants’ compensation - will help in finding a better balance 
between the needs for deterring anticompetitive actions while not discouraging pro-
competitive behavior. It is this need for balancing deterrence requirements that truly 
distinguishes the analysis of antitrust litigation from the more general area of the economic 
analysis of legal procedure. 
From those results, we can draw some simple policy conclusions. First, encouraging private 
actions is only useful for a Competition Authority when violators and non violators 
defendants are not treated alike and when potential plaintiffs have significant private 
information on the fact that the defendant has indeed committed a breach of competition law. 
Moreover, when it is desirable to encourage private actions, it is better to do so by increasing 
damages paid to successful plaintiffs than by lowering the costs of opening a case since the 
former weights more on liable than on non-liable defendants. In addition, the costs imposed 
by private actions to non-liable defendants may be attenuated by the introduction of 
compensation paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs to winning defendants. Finally, the rules of 
judicial procedure should constrain the Courts to rely solely on the facts established during 
the trial and not on background evidence about settlement offers. 
An interesting extension would consist in analyzing the impact of class actions - including the 
effects of conditional contracts for the lawyers - on the efficiency of a private antitrust system. 
However, this issue goes substantially beyond those raised in this article and is left for future 
research. 
